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    Tell all the truth / but tell it slant (Emily Dickinson).
Summary. In this essay I will explore the possibility of an objective ecological ethics. To 
do this, I follow the embodied ethos of relationships: meaningful expression and mutu-
al sharing occuring in living organisms and systems. Living beings on various levels of 
identity (cellular selves, individuals, and ecosystems) strive toward increased aliveness. 
They are self-healing, and generate meaningful relationships, all without the need or 
interference of human ethical thinking. Ecosystems tend toward complexity and orga-
nisms tend to avoid their own destruction. Both tendencies create “natural values” – 
values not extractable into abstraction, yet nonetheless fundamentally embodied in the 
actions of living beings and living systems. An ethics based on these principles (or 
insights) is inclusive in that it can be conceived as a sort of “poetic objectivity”. Here the 
ethically good is the increase in “aliveness”, which can be shared by other beings, and 
which is only possible as “being through the other”. Aliveness is ineffable and cannot 
be extracted analytically. Hence it is objective only in a poetic sense that can be shared 
through participation. An ethics of poetic objectivity leaves room to negotiate individu-
al relationships and narratives while providing goodness as an encompassing context 
tuning into the degree of sharing and mutual inspiration to be more alive. The natural 
values generated by sharing transformative relationships produce the whole of nature 
as an “ethical commons”. Its principles can be instructive in reorganising human exchange 
on ethical and economical levels.
Zusammenfassung. In diesem Aufsatz erkunde ich, inwieweit eine objektive ökologi-
sche Ethik möglich ist. Dafür werde ich das verkörperte Ethos untersuchen, Beziehun-
gen, Ausdruck und Praxis gegenseitigen Teilens in der Biosphäre. Organismen streben 
auf vielfältigen Ebenen ihrer Identität (zelluläre Selbste, Individuen und Ökosysteme) 
nach mehr Lebendigkeit. Sie bringen sich selbst hervor, heilen sich selbst und entwi-
ckeln produktive Beziehungen, ganz ohne Zutun menschlicher ethischer Erwägungen. 
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Ökosysteme tendieren dazu, über die Zeit komplexer zu werden, und Organismen ver-
suchen ihre eigene Zerstörung zu vermeiden. Beide Tendenzen bringen einen Norm-
horizont hervor, etwas, das man als „natürliche Werte“ bezeichnen könnte. Diese Werte 
sind nirgendwo festgeschrieben und können nicht auf eine abstrakte Ebene extrahiert 
werden. Sie sind zutiefst in den Handlungen lebender Wesen und lebender Systeme 
verkörpert. Eine Ethik, die auf diesen Prinzipien und Einsichten beruht, schließt alle 
Wesen im Sinne einer „poetischen Objektivität“ ein. Sie zentriert das ethisch Gute in 
einem schwachen Sinn als „Lebendigkeit“, die von anderen Wesen geteilt werden kann. 
Eine Ethik der poetischen Objektivität gibt Raum, um Beziehungen und Lebenserzäh-
lungen zu verhandeln. Lebendigkeit ist ein Allmendeprozess. Die natürlichen Werte, 
die durch das Teilen von Beziehungen, die beide Seiten verwandeln, zustande kom-
men, bringen eine ethische Allmende hervor. Ein solches Denken kann auch den 
menschlichen Austausch auf ethischer, aber auch auf ökonomischer Ebene neu struk-
turieren.
1.  Ethics in Thin Air
Ethics attempts to supply reasons for agents’ conduct. One might also say 
that it tries to devise a productive behaviour for subjects. What does it mean 
to behave in the right way? What is the good life? What constitutes a just 
decision? Or as Kant might put it: What ought we to do? The use of the pro-
noun “we” points to us, the ethical subjects. Ethics is a process of reaso-
ning for how ethical subjects should behave. 
As far as environmental ethics is concerned, the two predominant methods 
pay tribute to this subject-centered approach: either environmental ethics 
favours a variant of the stewardship approach towards the environment and 
nature, in which humans remain the only possible ethical subjects; or envi-
ronmental moral reasoning enlarges the title “ethical subject” to include 
parts of or all of nature, either by attributing human-like subject qualities to 
a few charismatic species (great apes, dolphins, crows, dogs, etc.), or by 
according intrinsic value to natural processes and individuals striving towards 
higher levels of being, e.g. more complexity (Light and Rolston 2002; Oel-
schlaeger 1991).
What a living subject actually i s , however, has not been made explicit 
in most ethical accounts (Varela 1997; Guattari 2000). Ethical reasoning, 
including environmental ethics, starts from an unclear idea of a subject. In 
other words, ethics is done without ontology. Or rather, these ethical sys-
tems do not openly name the ontology on which they build, instead remai-
ning based on some hidden ontological preconditions. In the case of ethi-
cal theories which presume that only humans are subjects and hence ethi-
cal agents, these presumptions are clearly dualistic, and hence anchored 
in Enlightenment-tethered philosophy. Every ethics presumes an ontology, 
because moral statements are about agents’ actions in a world, which can 
be shaped in a variety of ways. The first step proposed here, therefore, is 
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to engender a new ontology of the environment. This begins by imagining 
how we can best describe biological subjects and ecological relations.
Before we try to determine what an agent or a subject o u g h t  to do, 
we need to know what a subject i s . For this, it is important to see how it 
comes about, how it is connected to other agents and to the remainder of 
the world. In brief, this means to understand how subjectivity is created, 
and which inherent constraints and should to be considered. Any ethical 
judgement about justice that does not consider the living agent and her true 
needs is profoundly totalitarian. It serves discipline, not connection. But con-
nection is the endeavour of living beings. Controlling feelings and behavi-
our from an external position crucially overlook unfolding and exploring ethi-
cal desires from the inside of lived relationships and the lived self. Such an 
ethical stance from an external position is, therefore, paradoxically, pro-
foundly unethical. It is, alas, the predominant approach of classical ethics, 
which is mostly devoted to humans and their goals from an external-ratio-
nal, not from an embodied standpoint.
This ethical stance characterizes most reasoning about how to rightly 
treat the environment or other beings. Environmental ethics approaches 
ecosystems and other beings from the outside. What ethical reasoning 
lacks, however, is consideration of the embodied needs of beings in flesh 
and blood, including humans. Living beings’ needs are related to their life 
process, and cannot be refashioned through convenient theories of justi-
ce. The only option is to acknowledge them, in their splendour and incon-
venience, as they manifest. To ignore them through imposing circumscri-
bed external ethical principles, enforces a grating mismatch, inexorably yiel-
ding pain and destruction. This context might explain our current situation 
of ecological enervation and the extinction of wild species in the face of a 
highly developed academic ethical theory. This ethical theory, however, pre-
dominantly is about the control of subjects by finding ethical rules they must 
adhere to in order to be considered rational subjects, not about the embo-
died practices and maxims created sui generis by the unfolding of subjec-
thoods through mutual transformations (for allied critiques see Bateson 
and Bateson 2004; Deleuze and Guattari 1972; Guattari 2000).
Before finalizing any thoughts about ethics, however, we need to consi-
der the underlying ontology. To think the ontology of the environment means 
to think about what living beings are, as they create the sytem of ecologi-
cal relationships and only through these realize their individuality. In envi-
ronmental ethics, the idea of what an organism is, or an organic agent, or 
a subject, has not been discussed very widely. This is due to the astonishing 
fact that in the life sciences, but also in philosophy, there has been compa-
ratively little discussion or research into the ontology of life, what living 
things do, and how living subjects come about, as Varela (1991) observes 
in a seminal text on what life is (see also Varela 1997; Weber and Varela 
2002; Kull 2015; Weber 2016a and Weber 2016b).
Our ethical reasoning, then, must begin with an ontology of biological 
subjects. It must include, crucially, an understanding of how the biological 
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subject is related to the biological whole. It is my hypothesis that from an 
analysis of this relationship, we will automatically arrive at an environmen-
tal ethics. Such an ethics will construe what is right for the ethical agent in 
terms of what is right for the system(s) to which the agent is connected. 
This inherent connectivity holds potential because the underlying sys-
tem is a necessary condition which allows for the agent’s existence, and 
elicits the agents protection by virtue of her intent to survive and prosper. 
Here we can define an agent as a function of the self-differentiation of a 
larger whole. This relation of self-differentiation, begetting the role the indi-
vidual plays in and for the larger whole, is foundational for a systems approach 
to ethical thinking. 
We can therefore conclude that an ontology of embodied agents neces-
sarily yields an environmental ethics.  This ethics is based on the way indi-
viduals are emmeshed in order to produce a common good, the ecosys-
tem. The principles according to which productive ecological relationships 
in an ecological whole are created, which lead to the self-realization of indi-
viduals and the productive dynamics of the whole, can thus be considered 
as an embodied ecological ethics. The ethics i s  the ecosystem.
2.  From Self-Construction to Subject
To understand what an organic subject is, we need to observe what an 
organism actually does to maintain its livelihood. For quite a while, orga-
nisms have been viewed mainly as organic machines executing genetic 
orders or following causal-mechanic trajectories. If we take a different angle, 
however, we can instead view them as autopoietic processes – as entities 
whose activity consists in Autopoiesis, the material construction of their 
embod selves (Maturana and Varela 1980; Varela 1997; Weber and Varela 
2002). 
Varela (1997) defines an organism – and hence life – as a “process of 
creation of an identity”. Organisms bring forth an identity as a material pro-
cess: the observable telos of metabolism is to perpetuate itself. As I have 
mentioned elsewhere, 
[a] thing lives through the process of maintaining itself continuously as a whole. It 
strives to regenerate, grow and maintain its boundaries against internal fluctuations 
and external disturbances. Put in a more radical way: life is not a cascade of causal 
reactions, but rather its opposite – autonomy (Weber 2016a: 53). 
A living entity produces itself and all of its components autonomously. It is 
distinguished by the ability to retain its integrity in the face of changes in its 
environment. It generates the structure as well as the border of its surroun-
dings. The whole organic machinery has one primary goal: it produces 
exactly the components that have produced it. Ribosomes enable proteins 
to be formed that become ribosomes. Cell membranes which are brought 
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forth by the cell interior shelter the cell interior to produce membrane com-
ponents, and so forth (Weber and Varela 2002). 
Each single cell is a “process of creation of an identity” (Varela 1997). The 
most simple organism must be understood as a material system enacting 
the intention and the activity to maintain itself intact, to grow, to unfold, and 
to produce a fuller scope of life for itself. A cell is a process that generates 
the components necessary to maintain their ongoing production – while the 
materials, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus, and silicon flow through it. 
Ninety-nine percent of a cell’s activity is devoted to its own maintenance. 
This observation obtains for single cells and multicellular life forms. A high 
degree of self-relatedness also holds for higher levels of more complex 
organisms. In vertebrates, the bulk of neuronal activities have nothing to do 
with external stimuli but instead exhibits a creative and imaginary concern 
of self with self (Varela et al. 1991). 
It is important to see that the living entity exists as a self-identical struc-
ture in space and time, although at no moment is it materially identical with 
itself; matter passes through its changing spatial arrangements. Only the 
fact of being alive keeps this circuit closed. When an organism dies, the 
process comes to an end, and the components behave as normal chemi-
cal compounds tending to assume the highest possible degree of entropy: 
they decay. 
The organization of that which lives is therefore characterized by the 
conjunction of two different ontological realms. Unshaped matter and the 
process of regulation together make up the reality of the organism. The pro-
cess of living takes place in normal matter, except that life is organized in 
such a way that matter takes up autopoietic behaviours. The living cell 
governs the atoms of which it is built. Subjectivity must be viewed as a bodi-
ly, material process. It is not a miracle fallen from above, nor exclusively 
divine, nor a rational power only humans possess. Subjectivity cannot exist 
without bodies. Without the flesh of a living cell or a multitude of them, sub-
jectivity is unthinkable; it is deeply entangled with matter. 
Therefore, subjectivity is an empirical phenomenon. The empirical objec-
tivity that is so familiar to contemporary science can thus be enlarged by 
an “empirical subjectivity” – a condition of feeling and experiencing shared 
among all living beings (Weber 2016b). Instead of separating the world into 
the lifeless objectivity of matter and the arbitrary subjectivity of the unre-
stricted human mind that is free to choose whatever it wishes, as the com-
mon scientific approach has done, we need to recognize that subjectivity 
is not free and unrestricted, as it is coupled to the rules through which it 
emerges as a body. It is empirical, as an embodied subject also is an empi-
rical reality. It is intrinsic to lifemaking, as is skin or membrane.
An embodied subject is a process enacting momentary solutions for an 
underlying duality or disparateness which exists between the form (the pro-
cess of identity proper) of a living being and the matter passing through it. 
An embodied subject follows a tendency in complex biochemistry to bring 
forth material systems that auto-create themselves. A living being therefo-
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re is not a neutral process, but follows a logic of success (or failure) built 
into the very structure of its functioning. 
But we must observe that the process of creating one’s self as a sub-
ject is highly problematic. Subjects are not substances, unchangeable 
chunks of reality that once set into being remain more or less unchanged. 
They are also not timeless instructions or algorithms, like genes. A subject 
is a highly problematic process, an ongoing attempt of a positive union of 
an underlying separateness, a string of proposals to negotiate, integrate, 
and imagine, that only result for each fleeting moment in making the pre-
sence of that which we perceive as subject possible.
Because subjectivity is nothing substantive, but rather a process that 
can be achieved to a certain degree, the subject as such already has a 
built-in horizon of success. It can unfold, or it can be blocked. To take Varela’s 
example, a bacterium, a single cell, can successfully incorporate the sugar 
in its suspension medium, or it can fail. What is good for an embodied sub-
ject in a community of other such subjects? 
The roots of ethical reasoning do not start with ethical agents, rational 
subjects like humans consider themselves to be, but with the self-creation 
of subjects. The self-creation of subjects is a process mediating between 
two poles, and hence demands a negotiation of how a productive relation-
ship is possible between the side of self and the side of other, although 
these sides are only defined (and continously redefined) through the pro-
cess. This process joins together formerly independent standpoints, isome-
tric parts quivering at opposite polarities. There is no such thing as an ethi-
cal subject from the beginning, as all subjects are basically intersubjects, 
processes of creation oscillating between designated self and designated 
other.
If we can describe what supports the construction of subjects on the 
level of their embodied self-realization, this can provide a necessary foun-
dation to build a theory describing salutary processes between different 
subjects. After we have accepted that the subject-making process has ethi-
cal relevance, we need now observe how biological agents bring forth value 
through their life-making.
3.  Values as Natural Facts
Every living being interprets the world according to its needs and desire to 
persist and prosper. The world thus gains, in the same movement by which 
self and other are divided, existential significance for the emerging self. A 
“perturbation”, in autopoietic terms, is a stimulus that interferes with the 
organism from the outside, causing it to react in a way that is determined 
only by its inner processes and states. 
When organisms are conceived as autopoietic systems, their fundamen-
tal dimension of existence is in relation to meaning. A living being’s pre-
sence imbues meaning to surrounding things by transforming them into the 
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stage on which it plays out its existential drama. And through this sense, 
all things gain their existential role: their role for the organism becomes part 
of the organism’s reality regarding its experience of prosperity or defeat, 
stability or chaos – precisely because the organism has to “master the 
things”,  they m e a n  something to the organism and do not c a u s e  a 
behaviour directly. 
Embodied subjects never encounter “neutral” things or stimuli or infor-
mation, but instead every encounter presents valences of significance ran-
ging on a gradient from advantageous (or felicitious) to disadvantageous 
(infelicitous) for the experiencing subject. In the beginning, perception desi-
gnates no names, except the existential feeling of helpful or harmful. So in 
a way, we could say that e m o t i o n  is the first unfolding of the world. 
Perhaps an emotional background offers the deepest underlying structure 
of all concepts. The first fission of the world, the first discontinuity in the 
homogenous equilibrium of eternity, has no form and no structure; it is 
nothing but the amorphous cry of highest urgency uttered by the organism: 
life-giving or life-destroying, good or bad. 
The background against which an organism brings forth meaning is 
always existential. For the autopoietic system is always concerned with its 
self-regulation, and only via this self-regulation does it keep the onset of 
decay at bay. Meaning arises out of this dependent independence: the living 
system is not causally determined by its surroundings but nevertheless can-
not exist for a moment without it. Because the living being has to keep a 
distance from some matter, this creates a conundrum for it, for it precisely 
i s  matter. 
The perspective of a threatened and thus affirmation-dependent orga-
nism lays a new grid over the world: a ubiquitous scale of value. Everything 
life interacts with gains through the pragmatics of the interaction a value 
related to the amount it makes possible the continuity of existence. Because 
from the beginning it has an interest in itself, the organism’s active self-con-
firmation through interacting with its surrounding matter confers a signifi-
cance and place for that matter (Jonas 1973).
From this perspective arises the colourful ontological universe we expe-
rience. This is only possible from the perspective of a fragile being that is 
always threatened by its own destruction and thus invents ever-higher levels 
of integration. The world’s stage without living agents would be a comple-
tely neutral place. Only after life has come into it, is the world real in pros-
pering and pain, joy and misery. Only life is interested in its life as a conti-
nuity. Through this interest emerges “absolute value” (Jonas 1973) upon 
the stage. This a b s o l u t e  m e a n i n g  then is the only reliable constant 
in an organism’s life.
Organic subjectivity therefore creates an ethical stance as part of its 
self-creation process. The world created by the autopoietic self is deep with 
value. The logic of the living has a living ethics. What is disruptive or dege-
nerative for the organism is perceived as bad, and what gives it means to 
prosper is becomes its good. These subjective perceptions manifest as 
Andreas Weber62
experiences of existential values within the “Core Self” (Panksepp 2005) 
which navigates the impacts of these experiences (Weber 2016). The Core 
Self is these experiences. As Jonas (1973) put it: being an organism means 
to create the “Urwert”, the primordial value on which all experienced valu-
es are based: the wish to be alive. Living existence at its base essentially 
i s  ethics. Ethics is the flip side of existence. 
4.  Self as Other
So far we have only looked at the self-creation of the subject. What about 
the other, the primal locus of ethical concern? We have seen that the self-
construction of a subject is a highly precarious process involving the enmesh-
ment of two different domains, a self-creating form on the one hand, and 
the tendency of matter to dissipate in order to assume the lowest possible 
energy. The self-construction of a subject therefore is a process built on 
contradiction (Michelini 2012; Kull 2015; Weber 2016b). “Other” is already 
implied in “self”. 
If we loosen our focus on single embodied agents and look at subjects 
among other subjects, the situation remains the same. Being-in-a-world is 
about the embodied construction of self on and from others on different levels 
of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. The individual Self is nothing substantial, 
but always transformed through an encounter. Self is dependent on the other 
(Thompson 2007; De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007; Di Paolo and Thompson 
2014; De Jaegher 2015). An ethics can only be built on an analysis of how 
this relation of mutual creation can succeed. An environmental ethics there-
fore needs to take into account how a multitude of subjects together creates 
the conditions that make the existence of subjectivity possible. 
Varela in his 1991 book, The Embodied Mind, together with philosopher 
Evan Thompson and cognition researcher Eleanor Rosch proposed a posi-
tion called “Enactivism”, which slowly gained traction and in recent years 
has matured to a mainstream approach in cognitive science, relegating 
representational and computational views somewhat to the past. Varela 
was fond of using the expression “middle ground” for the ensuing position, 
which is a wording from Varela’s Buddhist background and which I under-
stand here thus: reality is neither bland illusion, nor brute fact, but poetic 
transformation.
The core concept of the Embodied Mind thesis sensu Varela et al. is 
“reciprocal specification” (Varela et al. 1991). World and agent are mutually 
specifying one another. The agent “enacts” a version of herself which is 
about the world, which is connected to reality, but in a subjective way. Rea-
lity is always accessible, but it is so only by being interpreted, put on the 
stage of subjective dramas, re-invented. This is not an act of absolute author-
ship, but a co-invention together with others and the whole world. 
Varela et al. (1991) derive their idea of “reciprocal specification” partly 
from research in psychological categorization (Rosch 1978). Their argu-
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ment is reminiscent of the position held by the most prominent historical 
representative of embodied phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty (1964). By 
stressing the common birth of phenomenal world and subjective standpoint 
in perception, Varela et al. (1991) try to overcome the danger of solipsism 
which every strong constructivist, and to some extent, also a biosemiotic 
position can possibly be subject to (as in Jakob von Uexküll’s (1980) impe-
netrable Umwelt “bubbles” which surround every organism). The common 
genesis of world and living agent provides the key for understanding the 
way organisms so remarkably fit into their environment, and why commu-
nication at all is possible. 
Enaction means that reality is always in the making. It is not here nor 
there but at any time in between, freshly created. This forecloses any final 
objectivity. As any contact is transformation, no pure “as such” is findable. 
The sphere in which mutual reciprocity yields perception, in which poetic 
expression is not an arbitrary judgement by an individualistic mind but the 
objective imagination of reality, has been described by Merleau-Ponty (1964) 
as the “flesh of the world”. 
The “flesh of the world” is not identical with the physiological tissue of 
the living body, but it is also nothing without it. It is the sphere of existenti-
al reciprocity which brings forth living reality. It is characterized by the fact 
that experience is never “about” something, but always happening between 
one being and another through a mutual transformation. Only according to 
the degree to which the experience is shared by both can it be real. Only 
to the degree that it involves an actual transformation, does it exist. What 
we conventionally see as a matter of touch or vision alone – a world “given” 
to our senses, the test tube environment “given” to a bacterial cell, a thing 
sitting before our eyes or a sound coming to our ears – is a matter of reci-
procity, of mutual creation, which makes both partners more real. 
Merleau-Ponty (1964) calls the ensuing mutuality, in which perceiver and 
perceived become entangled, “chiasm”. Only through chiasm, in the midd-
le of both, is there reality. This participation, however, is assumed by fee-
ling bodies. The “flesh of the world” to some degree is the flesh of the body, 
but it can also be there in verbal caresses which stir the soul as a soft wind 
stirs the fine hairs on the skin.
The knowledge body of ecology is a proof for the middle ground, the 
chiasmic interdependency of all subjects and things as well. Its paradigm 
is hypercomplexity, the entanglement of everything with everything. Here 
we have real interdependencies which make possible the diversity of its 
middle ground. The species diversity of, say, a red sea coral reef, which 
awaits full explanation in terms of the neo-Darwinian paradigm, is only pos-
sible as a network of infinite interactions. If we cut this network and remo-
ve some of its parts, it will change as a whole. 
The evolution of individual species, a snail feeding on algae for instance, 
cannot be explained by the outcome of external factors alone but only as 
a feature of the gestalt of the whole evolving reef. We see here clearly that 
a phenomenon, an embodied reality in space and time, is only possible 
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through the interaction of innumerable forces and fates. We have not only 
one level of meaning, but also an example of the reality of “flesh”: in the 
case of the coral reef, the most delicate organic layer that covers the stone 
of the coral heads.
The level on which self experiences itself as through the other is the 
sphere of meaning in which other is existentially relevant to self. Other is 
processed or transformed in terms of self. It appears as meaning for the 
own self. This meaning is “inside” the body, as inwardness, or core self, and 
cannot be separated from it. In this sense, subjectivity-as-interbeing is also 
always self-as-world. In being itself, as through-other, a subject is the world, 
as through-self. Summing up these steps:
1.  Subjectivity is always intersubjectivity.
2.  Subjectivity / Intersubjectivity is always embodied.
3.  Intersubjectivity is not o n l y  body. It happens in a poetic space, tran- 
scending body, while including it, but from the perspective of its exis-
tential imaginary dimension.
5.  “To live in Truth”: Ethics as Commons
Maybe the most important aspect of subjectivity, which interlaces with its 
other qualities, is that it is shared. It is connected to body, and body is 
something we share with all other living beings. Subjectivity therefore is not 
private, at least not fully. It has an entirely individual aspect, as my body is 
only mine, and its characteristics and quirks only belong to me. But, as the 
bodies of all biological species are deeply similar and intimately related 
through a common natural history, subjectivity is a faculty common among 
all beings. It is what binds us together. 
In sharing subjectivity, we  truly become subjects. The world that results 
from this mutual partaking in different empirical subjectivities is our com-
mon objective reality. As I explored more in depth in my book The Biology 
of Wonder (Weber 2016a): 
The ethics we need to look for in the realm of living things, therefore, cannot be a 
set of abstract principles. It must be a practice of realizing oneself through connec-
tion with others, who are also free to realize themselves. Gary Snyder (1990) calls 
this a ‘practice of the wild’. If we look to the ways other cultures have tried to become 
a creative part of ecosystems, hence to actually practice the wild, we can observe 
that the form in which they do this is what we would call a ‘commons’. The other 
beings are not an outside nor a resource. They share a common productive and 
poetic reality.          
Historically, we understand by ‘commons’ an economic system in which various par-
ticipants use the same resource and follow particular rules in order to not overex-
ploit it (Bollier 2014). If we look deeper into actual commons principles, we can see 
that traditional commoners do not distinguish between the resource they protect and 
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themselves, as users of the resource. The members of a commons are not concep-
tually detached from the space they are acting in. The commons and the commo-
ners are the same. This is basically the situation in an ecosystem (Weber 2015).  
The idea of the commons thus provides a unifying principle that dissolves the sup-
posed opposition between facts and rules. It cancels the separation of the ecologi-
cal and the social. In any existence that commits itself to the commons, the task we 
must face is to realize the well-being of the individual while not risking a decrease of 
the surrounding and encompassing whole. If nature actually is a commons, it follows 
that the only possible way to formulate a working ecological ethics – which inserts 
the human right in the middle of nature and at the same time allows for freedom of 
self-expression and technological invention – will be an ecology of the commons 
(Weber 2016a: 353).
Agency is always enfolded within a living system. Because of the ways 
agency comes about – mingling self-assertion as a positive value and other-
relation as another positive value (contradicting one another) – an orga-
nism is both sovereign and interdependent at the same time. Also in the 
commons, its members do not hold arbitrary sway as rulers but play their 
roles as attentive subjects through a network of relationships. All conse-
quences of their interactions reflect back on those who are acting. And not 
only humans are agents, but all other subjects – bats, fungi, bacteria, aes-
thetic obsessions, infections or guiding concepts – are equally active. A 
commons thus can be described as a rhizome – a material network of living, 
incarnate in meaningful connections, which constantly transforms itself as 
it mutates and evolves. 
The innermost core of aliveness cannot be controlled by a rationality which 
comes from outside. It cannot be controlled, but only conceived, through being 
involved in experiences and creative expressions. Every commons is always 
an embodied, material, perceptible, existential and symbolic negotiation of 
individual existence through the other and the whole. It is always creating an 
inside sphere of meaning, a living reality from which its members unfold. Com-
mons are spaces of feeling, and therefore origins of value. If humans create 
commons, then at best these are attempts to echo the forms of order implied 
in the self-creating wild through acts of creative transformation in response 
to the existential imperatives of the wild. It is this stance of negotiating, adap-
ting and enduring that has determined the way in which humans have dealt 
with the more-than-human world since time immemorial.
An objective ecological ethics therefore is possible. It is not only possi-
ble but it is the only way an ethics can be conceived that does not exclude 
the majority of subjects in the biosphere and with them certain dimensions 
of ourselves – those dimensions which are the most profound ones, and 
even the defining ones of our existence as embodied subjects-in-transfor-
mation. An ethics which is not meant to sever this dimension from oursel-
ves, and hence destroy itself in us and in the world, needs to be objective. 
It needs to be an ethics as the art of living relationships, which make the 
whole grow through the growth of its particulars.
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When I speak of objectivity, I do not conceive it in the strong binding way as 
maybe Christian ethics considers itself to be objective. Objectivity means that 
ethical “decisions” can be understood as processes of subject-construction 
in the web of an ecosystem of mutually interrelated life processes. Such deci-
sions are objective because the conditions of subject-construction are not 
arbitrary. They are shared by all beings which have sensible and fragile bodies. 
But as this objectivity comes about not by external laws, but through the pro-
spering of its actual realization in a commons of metabolic and material rela-
tionships, it is weak. It can be understood by sharing, by flowering, by crea-
ting, but it is difficult to pin down in general rules which are applicable for all 
cases in an abstract way. Aliveness is an embodied commons. 
The ethical objectivity I speak of can be imagined through a situation, 
within an individual body, and together with others. It is enacted, like a poem 
is enacted, composed and imagined on vaguely shared feeling and trans-
mitted through contagion. This kind of ecosystemic ethics follows “poetic 
objectivity” (Weber 2013; 2016a and 2016b). We could also say that poe-
tic objectivity always yields its objective ethics. It is intricate to bodies and 
their mixes and interpenetrations. It is in the flesh. As I have elaborated 
elsewhere (Weber 2016a):
An ecosystem through its shape as commons does not only integrate agents and 
the whole, comprised of such agents. Its reality is at the same time material and struc-
tural, experienced and created. It, therefore, combines subjective and objective per-
spectives. Emotional experience is not alien to the conception of an ecological com-
mons but central to it. In an ethics of mutual ecological transformation, feeling is a 
central part. As inwardness is the necessary way bodies experience themselves, fee-
ling is also a crucial component of an ecological ethics. It is not an add-on that might 
be tolerated; it is inextricably linked to the reality of ecological functioning. It is the 
value of flourishing life shining forth in the experiences of those who live it together. 
If a living being participates in exchange processes of an ecosystem, it also gets 
emotionally involved. This emotional dimension is how living beings experience the 
relevance of their connections, the meaning of how others reciprocate, and how the 
whole setting acts on their self-productive process. To be connected, to be in meta-
bolism, is always an existential engagement, and this echoes as feeling. Feeling is, 
so to speak, the core self of a commons ethic. It symbolizes how well the mutual 
realization of individuality and the whole are achieved.     
Our capability as living beings to inwardly experience the existential meaning of out-
ward relationships gives us the means of emotional ethical evaluation. We always 
unconsciously assess the degree to which an ecosystem, or any relational struc-
ture we are involved with, is able to grant us the freedom to be and to be in connec-
tion. This evaluation is part of the process of living and hence of relating. Inwardly, 
this is the feeling of being alive, the experienced aliveness. Feeling alive or ‘enliven-
ed’ is, therefore, an immediate way to experience whether a set of relationships is 
healthy or not. We could also call it the experience of beauty. It is an experience that 
connects the perspectives of first and third person, the observation and the felt 
meaning (Weber 2016a: 355–356).  
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Productive ethical behaviour transforms first-person perspectives through 
second-person ones, and through this, changes the whole. This ethically 
good is felt as “aliveness”, which can be shared by other beings, and descri-
bable as “being through the other”. Aliveness is not outspoken, nor can it 
be extracted analytically. Hence it is objective only in a poetic sense that 
can be shared through participation. Poetic objectivity is shared objectivity 
through mutual transformation and reciprocal specification in the generati-
on of meaningful ecological integration.
Therefore, “where there is much life, there is the potential for great beau-
ty”, as American environmental philosopher Sandra Lubarsky (2014) obser-
ves:  
[Beauty] is not a quality – blue or shiny or well-proportioned or a composite of these 
– overlaid on a substance. It is not owned by the world of art or fashion or cosme-
tics. […] It is embedded in life, part of the dynamic, relational structure of the world 
created by the concert of living beings. And it is what we name those relational struc-
tures that encourage freshness and zest so that life can continue to make life. […] 
Life, wilderness, biodiversity, and beauty are an interlaced knot; when the cord is 
cut, the intricacies are lost, the entire weave undone (Lubarsky 2014: 194–195).
By the experience of beauty we are able to evaluate the life-giving poten-
tial of a situation or an ecosystem. Beauty, therefore, as a sign of an enli-
vening situation, is itself giving life. Any aesthetic experience of nature thus 
is to some degree an ethical assessment. Ugliness, on the other hand, has 
a certain degree of toxicity. The functional desert of contemporary agricul-
tural landscapes with its few species leaves us uninterested, whereas a flo-
wering dry slope with its rose bushes and nightingales softens our heart. 
Rainforest and coral reefs fascinate us, the endless pine steppes of an 
industrial forest, less so. 
In the world of living beings, the beautiful system most often is the diver-
se system, and the diverse system is the good system because life through 
each individual desires itself as the greatest possible plenitude. Still, the 
beauty of natural systems never appears in a radiant triumph of final victo-
ry. Ecological stability and the beauty of life are built on the dialectics of 
birth and death. Life’s existence is fragile to the core. Its beauty, to which 
we are free to contribute at any moment, is the hope for healing. This hope 
is its objectivity.
Beauty is the sense of our own participation in an ethical process of 
mutual realisation. It can guide us through the different negotiations of the 
commoning process, whether this be the need to provide for food, to care 
for a watershed, or to build a loving relationship. In an objective ethics of 
ecosystems (and of relationships as ecosystems, and of ecosystems as 
relations) beauty-through-negotiation substitutes the philosopher’s ethical 
assessment or the rather inflexible ethical rules and social customs which 
overcrust history. 
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To live ethically can be felt through participation, through the degree to 
which this experience of participation is also the experience of self-realiza-
tion. To be ethical then is not different from being real, as David Abram 
(1997: 264) points to, when he suggests that, “a human community that 
lives in a mutual beneficial relation with the surrounding earth is a commu-
nity, we might say, that lives in truth”.
Notes
*  Some thoughts in this essay have been explored elsewhere in Weber (2013, 2015 
2016a and 2016b).
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